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THE STUDENT AS A STUDENT
By PHILLIP

MONYPENNY*

the rubric of the "student as a student" is included a
U NDER
multitude of topics which arise in the academic relationship between the student and the institution, especially those which have to
do with his presence as a student enrolled for a degree. This necessarily begins with his admission and continues through the general specification of requirements for a degree, the setting of levels of performance in individual courses, the evaluation of specific projects
such as theses and field work, the determination of levels of performance required for continuance, and maintenance of a record system
by which his progress may be checked. It includes the question of
whether his work in a specified period meets the standards set for
the awarding of a degree. It includes rules about the transfer of credit
from or to other institutions, recommendations to support applications to graduate or professional schools, certificates necessary for
professional licensure, and the awarding or denial of financial assistance.
In what follows, I rely heavily on those who have inquired into
the general relationship between the student and the university before
me. M. M. Chambers, who edited a little journal called Educational
Law and Administration' 30 years ago, compiled and reviewed some
basic cases. He expanded these articles into a series of volumes
appearing periodically called The Colleges and the Courts,2 the last
of which covered decisions through 1963. An early article by Zechariah Chafee on the determination of individual rights by private
associations and the subsequent articles by Warren Seavey, Alvin
Goldman, Clark Byse, and William Van Alstyne, cited by Van
Alstyne in his article for this conference, provide a necessary starting
*Chairman of the Department and Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois;
A.B. 1936, M.A. 1937, Washington University (St. Louis) ; Ph.D., University of
Minnesota, 1942.
1 1-6 EDUCATIONAL LAW AND ADMINISTRATION (M. Chambers ed. 1932-1939).
2 M. CHAMBERS & E. ELLIOTT, THE COLLEGES AND THE COURTS, JUDICIAL DECISIONS
CONCERNING HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1936); M. CHAMBERS,
THE COLLEGES AND THE COURTS, 1936-40, JUDICIAL DECISIONS CONCERNING HIGHER

EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1941)
COURTS,

1941-45,
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(1952); M. CHAMBERS, THE COLLEGES AND THE COURTS SINCE 1950 (1964).
These are compilations of decisions in all aspects of law affecting colleges and univerversities, but do regularly review cases on the legal aspects of student-university
relationships.
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point, even though they deal primarily with
the question of dismissal,
3
which is not the direct topic of this article.
However, the principles which govern this section are not different from those sketched earlier in Van Alstyne's article, The Student as University Resident. Although the sections on Colleges and
Universities in Corpus Juris Secundum and in American Jurisprudence
2nd list pages of references indicating an unlimited discretion for
private colleges and universities in admitting students, setting up
standards for awarding degrees, and dismissing students for failure
to meet these standards, and almost as unlimited a discretion for
public universities (checked largely by procedural requirements),
there are a variety of legal principles on the basis of which legal
limitations on university discretion have been successfully urged.'
The variety of approaches to the limitation of discretion has been
set out in four classes by Alvin Goldman. They are constitutional
theories, in loco parentis theories, contract theories, and a trust or
fiduciary theory which is his own.' Constitutional limitations have
so far been found only to apply to public institutions, although some
authors argue that the public-private distinction is untenable in this
field.6 The in loco parentis theory provides for Goldman the elements
of a status or fiduciary theory, even though as a literal justification
for college regulation of student nonacademic affairs it is being abandoned. The contract theory has provided both a justification for
unlimited discretion and a basis for finding an obligation to respect
certain student rights. The fiduciary theory which Goldman propounds has yet to find a positive affirmation in any court decision
affecting the relationships between the student and the university.
However, if we stay only within the established doctrines which
apply to universities and colleges in general, without reference to
their public or private status, there is still ground to assert that colleges and universities have legal obligations to their students which
cannot be obliterated simply by reference to the discretion and presumed good faith and judgment of institutional authorities. Nor can
3

See Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 DENVER L.J. 582 (1968),
listing the principal references. Much use has been made of the Note, Private Government on the Campus -Judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362

(1963).

4 15 Am. JUR. 2d Colleges and Universities §§ 16-28 '(1964) ; 14 C.J.S. Colleges and

Universities §§ 8-29 (1939). These summaries are very firm in asserting the very
large discretion of all schools, particularly the virtually unlimited discretion of private
schools, although the classic cases to the contrary are also cited.
5
See Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students- A Fiduciary Theory,
54 Ky. L.J. 643 '(1966).
6 Parker, Evans v. Newton and the Racially Restricted Charitable Trust, 13 How. L.J.
223 (1967). The distinction between public and private is explored and its significance for the assertion of certain constitutional rights minimized by Pollitt, Dime
Store Demonstrations: Events and Legal Problems of First Sixty Days, 1960 DUKE
L.J. 315, 347-65. See also Comment, ProceduralLimitations on the Expulsion of College and University Students, 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 542, 547 (1966).
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these obligations be obliterated by the retention of an unlimited discretion as a part of the body of institutional regulations which the
student presumably accepts as part of his contract of admission and
attendance.
In recognizing that the acceptance of a student as a student
creates a mutual obligation which cannot be wholly defined by a
unilateral and wholly discretionary act of institutional authority, the
courts have placed explicit or implicit stress on the value to the individual and to society of the opportunity to gain an education.
Although for some purposes attendance at either a public or a private
institution may be defined as a privilege rather than a right, it is still
a valuable privilege, having for certain purposes almost the status of
a property right.' Privileges may be made subject to a reasonable, but
not an arbitrary, discretion, and reasonableness implies the possibility
of judicial intervention where the limits of reasonableness are passed,
and this in turn implies ultimate judicial determination of whether
a particular act or rule is reasonable. The consequences of given acts
or rules to the individual student who complains of them will have to
be weighed against the normally valid institutional claim of expertise
and discretion.
This weighing process is easy to reach, since the privileged position of public and private institutions, their status as perpetual trusts
in the case of private institutions, the tax exemption they normally
enjoy, and the restraints on political authorities in regulating their
affairs, all rest on the great benefit of their services to the general
society. 8 In order to protect against entirely arbitrary or discriminatory
decisionmaking by those institutions having control over the disposition of many beneficial services to others, their conduct cannot be
relieved of the possibility of legal review; however, many decisions
in individual cases may hold that they acted within the limits of their
discretion and within their fields of presumptive competence.
Even the contract theory, which has often been used to justify
unlimited discretion in individual cases, implies obligations which
cannot be determined entirely by the unilateral decision of the institution. The university or college has been held obliged to provide
7Berea College v. Commonwealth, 211 U.S. 45, 58 (1908) (dissenting opinion by
Harlan, J.). This case arose out of the attempt to enforce a state law requiring segregation in all institutions of education. Justice Harlan asserted a liberty which could
not be breached by state regulation. That the value of an education to the individual
creates a most important right which can be limited only by due process requirements
is strongly asserted in Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
8 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). This classic case and others, asserting the right to offer and receive an education which cannot be abrogated by state
law, are reviewed by Constanzo, Wholesome Neutrality: Law and Education, 43
N.D.L. REv. 605, 615 (1967). See also Parker, supra note 6, at 265-68, for an argument on the parallelism of private and public activity in education and welfare as
creating the basis for the assertion of constitutional rights as against private authority.
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that which is stated or implied in the contract, including an opportunity to study, receive credit, and whatever degree or other certificate
is normally given at the end of successful work. Schools have also
been held to an orderly and accustomed procedure in determining
what is successful work. The reserved power of dismissal which is
often asserted as part of the contract between the school and the
student, being set out in bulletins or rules, does not warrant the
university in arbitrarily refusing readmission after a period of attendance, or refusing to grant a degree once stated conditions have
been complied with. One may speculate on whether the contract
doctrine, so cherished by administrators, might justify an inquiry
as to whether the institution is in fact offering what it purports to
offer by way of educational programs, supporting facilities, safe
dormitories, edible food, adequate provision for medical emergencies,
and perhaps even a Christian atmosphere.' 0
The fiduciary principle which Goldman proposes to substitute
for the contract principle as the major basis for determining legal
relationships between the student and the institution draws in part
from the in loco parentis principle. That doctrine asserted not only
an authority over the student but an obligation to him; it was justified by the need to protect him against his own immaturity. It is a
status conception, an obligation inhering in a relationship not derived from, nor more than partially modifiable by, the specific terms
of a contract. A university or college which acts against a student's
9 The basic cases on the right to a degree are summarized in Legal Right of a Student
to a Diploma or Degree, in 4 EDUCATIONAL LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 7 (M. Chambers ed. 1936). Among the more striking cases holding against unqualified discretion
are Baltimore Univ. v. Colton, 98 Md. 623, 57 A. 14 (1904) ; Booker v. Grand Rapids
Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909) ; State ex rel. Nelson v. Lincoln Medical College, 81 Neb. 533, 116 N.W. 294 (1908) ; People ex rel. Cecil v.
Bellevue Hosp. Medical College, 60 Hun. 107, 14 N.Y.S. 490 (Sup. Ct. 1891). Cases
asserting that discretion was not abused in refusing to grant graduate degrees are
Moore v. Lory, 94 Colo. 595, 31 P.2d 1112 (1934) ; Edde v. Columbia Univ., 8 Misc.
2d 795, 168 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct. 1957), aff'd, 6 App. Div. 2d 782, 175 N.Y.S.2d
556 (1958). For an interesting discussion suggesting limits on handling student
records see Strahan, Should Colleges Release Grades of College Students to Draft
Boards? 43 N.D.L. REv. 721 (1967).
Recent cases indicating limits on public institutions to arbitrarily limit the admission of students are Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1966) (improper exclusion
of a student from a school of architecture, who, while not conforming to regulations,
had acted in accordance with the advice of an advisor) ; Kolbeck v. Kramer, 46 N.J.
46, 214 A.2d 408 (1965) (requirement of vaccination may not be imposed on a student whose religion is contrary to it, if no showing is made of a danger to the health
of others).
On the right to judicial review of the question of whether discretion was exercised arbitrarily in excluding students because of a change of academic standards
after their initial enrollment see Schoppelrei v. Franklin Univ., 11 Ohio App. 2d 60,
228 N.E.2d 334 (1967) (overruling a demurrer sustained in the trial court). On the
right to a degree where an institutional authority had waived an ordinarily imposed
continuous enrollment requirement see Blank v. Board of Higher Educ., 51 Misc. 2d
724, 273 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
10
On the liability to an injured student see Jay v. Walla Walla College, 53 Wash. 2d
590, 335 P.2d 458 (1959) (the defense of implied assumption of the risk in the
student's contract with the university was denied, as it has been in similar cases).
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interests without an offsetting necessity rooted in the university or
college purpose and a reasonable means for achievement of that
purpose clearly departs from the obligation to protect the interests
of the students entrusted to its care. It would be rash to say that
the student's interest might never be protected by the courts."
What has made these principles so far a matter of logical
assertion rather than of law is that, except in a few deviant cases,
the courts have chosen not to review in detail the university or
college's use of discretionary authority in relation to students. This
does not mean that obligations and limits on discretion are not
recognized in the very process of entertaining cases for decision;
rather, the opinions suggest that the situations, at least as presented
in the formal proceedings, have not seemed to the judges to be such
a departure from a reasonable use of discretion that intervention was
justified.12 Some of the cases seem to have taken the rights of the
students rather lightly, but as the completion of some phase of
education beyond high school becomes more of an absolute condition
for success in achieving gainful employment and a respected position
in the world, the value given to the student's interest in remaining
in school and in earning whatever formal credits or degrees his work
justifies should rise, and the reasonability of a given rule or decision
3
is likely to be more closely scrutinized.1
In the fields of institutional authority covered by this article,
most decisions are provisional and intermediate. Except for denial
of admission, or expulsion, the decisions made about a student's
fate are cumulative. For example, his admissibility or nonadmissibility to various curricula, and the degree which he seeks, depend on
many factors, including all his grades, the completion or noncompletion of a variety of courses and tasks prescribed for a degree, and
the cumulation of the nonpayment of library fines or dormitory
bills. Given the disposition of the courts not to interfere in the details
of any complicated enterprise, especially a private one, and to avoid
judgment until final questions are presented, it is not likely that any
adverse decision other than the critical and final one can be brought
11 See Goldman, supra note 5; Byse, Procedures in Student Dismissal Proceedings, in
THE COLLEGE AND THE STUDENT 305 (L. Dennis & J. Kaufman eds. 1966). The
classic decisions holding due process necessary in the dismissal of a student by a
private institution, because of state support received, include Commonwealth ex rel.
Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77 (1887).
12
See State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942), cert.
denied, 319 U.S. 748 '(1943); Wright v. Texas Southern Univ., 277 F. Supp. 110
'(S.D. Tex. 1967), aj'd, 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968). In an earlier case of dismissal
in a state court, People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees, 10 Ill. App. 2d 207, 134
N.E.2d 635 (1956), due process was found satisfied, although the plaintiff was only
informed of the charge and not the evidence against her and could only make an
unsupported statement in rebuttal.
13 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961). But see Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1966) ; Schoppelrei
v. Franklin Univ., 11 Ohio App. 2d 60, 228 N.E.2d 334 (1967).
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successfully into court. Also, if deference to the wisdom and good
faith of faculty and administrators continues in academic and disciplinary matters, even final judgments are not likely to be overturned unless they appear on their face to be arbitrary. 4 A general
analogy to the relationships between the courts and the public
bureaucracies would seem to be in order here. The existence of an
appropriate procedure for defining issues, for gathering data with
respect to them, and for making a decision after due consideration of
relevant circumstances is likely to minimize the chances of an
independent decision by the courts on the merits of the case. If the
procedure stands, the administrative decision might also stand.15
There is a corollary, moreover, from the field of administrative regulation - if the courts take on too many institutional decisions
because they appear to be bad, they may develop confidence in their
own expertise and routinely set aside decisions in apparently technical
fields. The experience of the Federal Communications Commission
in the federal courts seems to support this point.' 6
The application of constitutional limitations to student rights
in general rests on the continued tenability of the distinction between
public and private institutions. The recent cases overturning decisions of dismissal for asserting the civil liberties of faculty and
students have all arisen at public institutions. They have rested on
the view that the fourteenth amendment applies to the campus
as to other areas of state governmental action, and that neither
attendance nor employment can be made to rest on a waiver of fourteenth amendment rights. When the institution involved is a public
one, there is ample precedent for going into court over a denial of
civil liberties rights, including the right to procedural due process.
The due process and equal protection conceptions presumably also
include the question of whether regulations are reasonable, fair in
relation to various situations and parties, and whether their application in a given instance rests on some kind of evidence.
The undecided question is the extent to which private institutions may ignore the standards of the fourteenth amendment,
especially its due process and equal protection standards, in the
government of their campuses and the regulation of their student's
14 State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942), cert. denied,
319 U.S. 748 (1943); Wright v. Texas Southern Univ., 277 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Tex.
1967), a/I'd, 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968); People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of
Trustees, 10 Ill. App. 2d 207, 134 N.E.2d 635 (1956).
15 RCA v. United States, 341 U.S. 412 (1951).
16 FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953). Here, the Court apparently
reacted to a sloppy justification of an FCC decision.
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academic and nonacademic lives." It has been argued that they
8
cannot ignore them.1
One basis for such a conclusion is a reexamination of the publicprivate distinction. Under what circumstances is a private agency or
institution sufficiently associated with government to come under
legal restraints which apply to government itself? A key case representing a shift in the thinking of the federal courts is Shelley v.
0 in which a private freedom of contract was not denied
Kraemer,"
but the right to its judicial enforcement was. In the much cited case
of Marsh v. Alabama,2 0 a company town, admittedly the private
property in every respect of a private corporation, was found to be
bound to the standards of the fourteenth amendment in respecting
freedom of expression (the distribution by Jehovah's Witnesses of
their characteristic tracts), because it acted in lieu of a government.
There are other cases where seemingly "private discrimination" has
been held violative of the fourteenth amendment because of the
public function being served.2 '
The special relationship of educational and other eleemosynary
corporations to government has long been recognized. As noted
above, their purposes have been held to justify exemption from
taxation and tort liability.22 The grant of public money to educational
institutions and hospitals operated by religious bodies has been
upheld because of the public value of their services. 23 The right to
17 Equal protection now provides a constitutional guarantee not only against racial
discrimination or legislative malapportionment but also against various unreasonable
classifications as in welfare policy, Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa.
1967) ; Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. Ala. 1967) ; the violation of religious
freedom in the setting of requirements for the receipt of unemployment compensation,
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) ; and the prohibiiion of a fair housing act
by state constitutional amendment, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). Problems of classification are central to the question of the reasonableness of the decisions
by college authorities on such questions as admission, the grant of scholarship assistance, and of whether reasonable standards of scholarship are being met by degree
candidates.
18 See Note, supra note 3, and Goldman, supra note 5.
19 334 U.S. i (1948).
20 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
21 For a carefully detailed discussion see Parker, supra note 6. Cases finding apparent
private action sufficiently governmental to require conformance to the standards of
governments include Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
The refusal to admit a doctor to the staff of a private hospital has been found
contrary to due process. Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817
(1963). This case contains a careful and persuasive discussion of the limits of the
distinction between public and private when an important individual "right" is being
decided by an institution which, though "private," provides an important public
service and is heavily dependent on tax exemptions and government subsidies.
22 M. CHAMBERS, THE COLLEGES AND THE COURTS, JUDICIAL DECISIONS CONCERNING
HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1936). This work has an extensive

discussion on the doctrine of tort immunity for charitable trusts, a doctrine whose
modifications toward the imposition of full tort liability is noted in successive editions.
23Horace Mann League v. Board of Pub. Works, 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51, cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 97 (1966), noted in 43 N.D.L. REV. 659 (1967).
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operate independent religious schools, despite a state act forbidding
them, has been asserted because of the general interest in providing
education through whatever available type of organization or institution.2 4 That these exemptions and benefits depend on the public
service provided is underlined by a recent Maryland decision denying
the right of the state to spend money on buildings for schools which
have a clearly religious content to their curriculum and educational
purposes. 5 Increasingly, the activities of private eleemosynary institutions, including educational institutions, are parallel to the much
larger operations of government, and they operate in part with direct
or indirect governmental funding. How long can their existence
depend on a privileged legal status and their relationships with
faculty and students be regulated by a rather far-out view of the law
of contract?
A second approach to the question of the applicability of general constitutional guarantees to private schools is to ask under what
circumstances private power, whether over employment or over
such benefits as admission to and continuance in private institutions
of higher education, can be conditioned upon a waiver of what are
otherwise constitutional rights? Contracts which require a waiver
of constitutional rights may be unlawful.2 " It has been decided that
unions may not require a waiver of a legal or a constitutional right
as a condition of continued membership, that employers must provide meeting places for their employees attempting to organize and
obtain bargaining recognition for a union, and that the state itself
may not attach unconstitutional conditions to a contract of employment.17 Similarly, academic freedom has been cited as a freedom
which may not be breached by attaching a condition to an employ28
ment contract.
The great weight of decided cases favors a virtually unrestricted
freedom of private institutions to determine the conditions of student
attendance, to set up regulations to govern them in nonacademic
as well as academic matters, and to discipline them for breaches
of regulations, including the ultimate penalty of expulsion. Only
24

See Constanzo, supra note 8.

2Horace Mann League v. Board of Pub. Works, 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51, cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 97 (1966).
On the failure of loyalty oaths as proper conditions attached to employment see Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952).
27 Affeldt & Seney, Group Sanctions and Personal Rights -Professions,
Occupations
and Labor Law (pts. 1-2), 11, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 382, 179 (1967), citing Mitchell
v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 196 Cal. App. 2d 796, 16 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1961).
The tenor of the article with respect to labor unions applies, and is also intended to
apply to other social institutions who are able to exercise coercive power over their
members.
28
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
26
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recently have public universities been restricted, and these restrictions
arise largely in the areas of free speech and free expression. If universities and colleges have this freedom where extreme penalties are
involved, the restraints on them in less final actions taken in the
general course of university administration are clearly even less
extensive. The questions raised in the preceding pages arise because
there are counter tendencies or postulates which might be taken to
justify the existence of rights on the part of students and far more
vigorous judicial intervention in their defense than has occurred.
Perhaps it is not at all likely to occur, despite isolated decisions.
However, there are parallels in other fields which should make us
cautious about denying all such possibilities.
The thoroughgoing judicial pursuit of racial equality in all of
the areas where some use of public authority seems to impose or
buttress inequality; the equally thorough pursuit of enforcement of
the rights of defendants in criminal cases; the explosion of litigation
enforcing the rights of Indians in long-disregarded tribal claims;
the relentless application of equal protection principles to the question of representation in state and local government; the discovery
of a right of travel which cannot be wholly restricted at the discretion of the State Department; and the extensive intervention in
deportation cases, all show a sensitivity of the courts to the claims
of the disadvantaged which would have been hard to predict from
decisions of a quarter of a century ago, and a present willingness to
take on burdens from which earlier generations of judges flinched.
Given the dramatic intensity of interest in all phases of higher education at the present time, the courts may well be provoked to take
a new interest in the problem of just relationships on the campus.
The new activism of the courts in cases affecting civil liberties may
be a forewarning.
Apart from what the courts may do, there are sound educational
reasons for asserting that explicit standards of justice and equal
treatment should enter into all of the regulatory phases of the
relationship between an educational institution and its students. The
achievement of an atmosphere of free inquiry to which the faculty,
students, and administrative officers of higher education have committed themselves through their approval of the Joint Statement on
Rights and Freedoms of Students also requires an atmosphere in
which justice is not only done but seen to be done.2" The world of
educational administration, like the world of politics, is a world of
negotiations, of adjustment and accommodation of interests, and of
29

Monypenny, University Purpose. Discipline and Due Process, 43 N.D.L. REV. 739
(1967); Monypenny, Toward A Standard for Studenl
& CONTEMP. PROB. 625 (1963).

Academic Freedom, 28 LAW
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high-minded deals and payoffs. It is a world of insiders, despite the
structure of participation by the rank and file faculty and student
body. Like politics, however, it must be conducted within an overarching framework of just principle if those who are not directly
parties to the negotiation, but are affected by them, are to accept
the outcomes and have confidence in those who conduct them. It is
to questions of just principle rather than to questions of the permissible legal limits of authority that the attention of those who govern
institutions should be turned. The cautions of this article are directed
to that end, rather than an assertion of a clear body of legal principles
defining and binding institutional discretion. If the agencies of
education act justly, and seem to act justly, the courts will find very
few occasions to impose a judicially developed view of justice on
them.
In closing, I want to reflect for a moment on the planning
session which preceded this meeting. It seems to me that some
of the technical discussion we have engaged in today about the defensibility or indefensibility of various kinds of legal formulas for
defining the university's control over students could have been
avoided if we reflected again on the purpose for which the doctrines
of contract, status, in loco parentis, and the equal protection of the
laws were brought into the discussion.
One of the implicit assumptions which seems to be part of many
administratively oriented discussions about the college or university
relation to students draws on the legal tradition which, as summarized in the most available sources, indicates a very large and
apparently unreviewable discretion not only to make rules but to
decide whether they have been transgressed. The conclusion in these
discussions is that, legally, the ground is open and you could do as
you pleased. Such a conclusion seems to have been behind the institutional handling of a great many disciplinary as well as academic matters. From a legal standpoint, there is no difference between the two fields.
One of the purposes of this conference was to discover whether
there were some rather impersonal sets of rules derived from legal
principles which had application to student-university relationships,
which indicated appropriate restraints on institutional powers, and
which also had implications for institutional responses to crises and
provocations. An indication that such restraints exist, i.e., that discretion is not absolute or unreviewable, is one of the conclusions
of all of the principal speakers at this conference, although none
of them has provided an absolutely firm conclusion of law applicable
in very specific situations, unless the fourteenth amendment restraints
on the public colleges and universities are regarded as having a
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very specific content. What the articles, including mine, are saying
is rather, "Gentlemen, you don't have a completely free hand in
dealing with students. There are some legal doctrines which imply
restraints applicable to you if you transgress a set of limits, not too
well defined to be sure, but limits all the same."
The issue is not what these restraints are, but how to use the
recognition of legal restraints as a caution, that is, the student's place
in the institution, and his recognizable rights and privileges as a part
of that institution are matters about which we need to do some
rather hard thinking, free of the clichs which the law so readily
provides. Obviously, whatever the applicable law, we should think
about such concerns for their own sake, or at least we should do so
because of the realistic prospect of being punished in court as a
consequence of not having thought hard and well before we acted
in a difficult situation. Of course we may be in trouble, whether
inside or outside of the courts, no matter how hard or well we
think, but that does not justify a lack of effort. It therefore seems
to me that what I and others have had to say on various legal topics
is less important than the extent to which our discussion, which has
been remarkably thoughtful and intense, will have an impact on
how we operate in our various fields of responsibility on the campus.
Having paid my respects to the framework of the discussion, I
would like to comment on the question of how we regard the structure of the university, a matter which has not been dealt with squarely by the articles in this symposium, with the exception of Mr. Lunsford's discussion of this particular topic as being a question of
community. For this purpose I would like to introduce a distinction
between authority and power.
In talking about legal restraints, one talks about something
which I will roughly define as power, that is, one is talking about
where the legal capacity to determine certain questions lies, and what
limits, if any, there are on that capacity. Most of the law on the
topic of university or college power conforms to this usage.
Power is an attribute of the university or college as a corporation. Our earlier discussion was fascinating, because the university
was referred to as though it was something which did not include
the students, the faculty, most of the administrative officers, or the
nonacademic staff. To be sure, it controlled them, but it was not
them. It was spoken of as something independent of the particular
personalities and defined internal roles, which are its corporeal
manifestation, an impersonal being which comes to conclusions and
acts on them. This is the appropriate legal view of a corporation as
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a fictitious personality which cannot be subsumed in the individual
personalities who may at any time man the various offices within it.30
If an individual is summoned to court as the president or a
member of the board of trustees of X university, that is in some
ways an impersonal matter. The individual is represented by counsel
who actually appears in court, and the president or trustee is not
likely to be personally fined or jailed. However, in the operating
life of the institution in which the acts of legal consequence arose,
it was not this impersonal abstraction which was working. As Mr.
Lunsford has pointed out so eloquently, the university is an internal
and differentiated structure with various roles and various responsibilities, a structure in which whatever legal powers exist cannot
readily be exercised in a simple and direct way from any single point.
The internal process of decisionmaking is a very diffuse one, as the
politically responsible administrators know, much to their occasional
distress. 3 ' The important question in understanding or prescribing
for the academic institution is not that of power but of authority who does what, who shares in the decision, even if only by inaction
rather than action, and who eventually writes the signature which
commits the institution. The question of authority is far more diffuse than the question of power, because various people enter into
the decisionmaking process who cannot be said in any formal sense
to be a part of the institutional power structure, if one uses power
as meaning that which has direct legal effect.
In the spirit of the old public law employee-officer dichotomy,
I note in browsing through the law books some reference to the
faculty as having the status essentially of employees, not as officers
of the corporation. This is undoubtedly an accurate statement. On
the other hand, in the normal conventions of academic institutions,
the faculty members operate as persons who have independent areas
of decision - one might say independent jurisdictions - or who
make independent contributions to the decisionmaking process, since
most of these processes are collaborative and not in any simple
sense hierarchical. In this sense of defined areas of competence and
independence of action within those areas, they are much more like
a common law officer than a common law employee, even though
their legal relationship to the institution is governed by contract.
In this, as in so many other areas of institutional life, the law on
The reference is to the discussion by von Gierke of the evolution of views concerning
the character of associations and corporations in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries
when this was a central issue. 0 VON GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF
SOcIETY, 1500 TO 1800, ch. 1, § 5, at 62 et seq. (E. Barker transl. 1957).
31 Politically responsible administrators are those who must account to the outside public
for the conduct of the institution, whether the institution is public or private.
30
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the matter is an inadequate guide to developing workable operating
relationships.
The mention of the pattern of authority within the institution
brings us to the question of ends, since authority has meaning in
terms of the purposes for which it is used. One of the most characteristic and important uses of institutional authority is in defining the
ends or purposes of the institution, at least that is what the writers
on administration tell us for organizations in general. If we deal
with power, then those who have legal power define the ends of
the institution. In this sense, we see at once that the definition
of the ends or goals of the institution is by no means a prerogative
of the board of trustees, whatever the law may hold. None of our
academic institutions have their ends defined strictly by boards of
trustees. They are also defined in various parts by the incorporating
body, society, the accrediting association, and the endless interaction of the administrative officers, faculty, student body, and, I
might add, the nonacademic staff, which disposes of a considerable
portion of institutional authority. The bookkeepers, the parking lot
operators, the student union staff, the dormitory managers, the
architect, the engineer, and the registrar, all have a sizeable impact
on the character of the institution.
It is interesting to note that in none of the discussions on the
actual or ideal government of a university does anyone ever refer
to the nonacademic staff, although they are very clearly part of the
government. If one takes some of the challenges which are currently being put to the university, such as the obligation to act morally
in all relationships with the community or society, one must consider
such matters as employment, purchasing, land acquisition, and investment, which are not normally controlled either at the faculty
or presidential level but by another group of persons entirely. Their
connection with the rest of the campus is unfortunately slim. They
are not part of the general discussion of ends and purposes, but
they influence these ends, not perhaps those which are espoused,
but those which are achieved. The question of ends cannot therefore be said to be in fact the exclusive or particular concern of any
single element of the academic institution.
The complexity of the university in its procedures for defining
ends has something to do with the question of the relationship of
the students to the institution, both with respect to what the relationship is or should be and as to the mode of resolving questions with
respect to it. The legal authority of the institution to define its
academic character and to judge student accomplishments in achieving the standards for institutional awards determined by that academic character has gone virtually unchallenged in the courts. The
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courts normally settle the cases in terms of jurisdiction - the institution has power in these matters, and its use of that power is virtually nonreviewable. Thus, difficult questions of justice, including
the procedure for achieving justice, are avoided. However, for the
institution itself the question is not what legal competence it has
to set academic standards but what standards should be set and with
whose participation. The question of standards must embrace also
the question of academic purpose - What are the ends to be achieved
in the educational program? The challenge we have faced from the
students is that these are not matters solely for decision by the
faculty and the administrative officers.
We must meet the student challenge by means other than the
reiteration of legal authority, or even the reiteration of the doctrine
of special competence. The processes of decisionmaking must be
looked at in terms of who has a legitimate interest which ought to
enter into the decision. It is not a question of who has established
rights but of who has legitimate interests, whether those interests
are recognized in the decisional pattern or are being protected by it.
I recognize that there may be more than one way of advocating,
advancing, or recording an interest when it is not apparently included in the formal arrangements, but there should be some way
in which it has an impact if it is a legitimate interest.
The feeling of outrage which we may quite properly sense in
viewing certain events must be moderated by reflection on the questions of who are members of our community, who has a right to
make assertions about its character, and in what way can those
assertions be incorporated in the self-definition of the institution.
It is not a matter of abandoning perquisites. It is a matter of recognizing that the pattern of authority in educational institutions is one
in which many share; that there are many forms of authority including enrolling or not enrolling for classes and curricula; that all of
these modes of authority shape institutions; and that a claim to
authority by those who have never possessed it is not necessarily an
indication that the walls have been mined and the torch is being
laid to the powder train. If one approaches institutional decisions in
this broader context, then the function of a cautionary statement of
legal limits is clear, and one need not be concerned with the questions of whether status, contract, or constitutional principle is the
best way of defining this obviously complex relationship.

